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THE ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDGES: THEIR DUTY TO
ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS WHEN THE OTHER BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT DEFAULT
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER*
A. INTRODUCTION
At least since Marbury v. Madison in 1803 the proper role of
the federal judiciary has been debated. Particularly since the days
of the Warren Court, the federal judiciary has come under heavy at-
tack because of its decisions upholding the constitutional rights of in-
dividuals. The attacks generally come from those who disagree with
the decisions on the merits, but there are some who question whether
the judiciary has exceeded its proper constitutional limitations, even
though they may agree with the actual holdings of the courts.
Numerous books and articles have been written on this topic and they
raise very basic, serious questions about the proper role of each of
the three branches in our constitutional system of government. There
are well-developed theories supporting all sides of the issue. So, the
obvious question-why choose this topic? I did so for one simple
reason: in my view the federal judiciary is becoming less and less
receptive to plaintiffs seeking to enforce individual rights guaranteed
by the Constitution at a time when the need for a strong, indepen-
dent judiciary is becoming greater. Fewer and fewer federal judges
are willing to serve as a check on the other branches of government.
Why is this the case? I'm not sure -maybe it simply reflects the mood
of the nation.
In addition to the normal debate among scholars and the familiar
attacks on particular decisions, there are some other more disturbing
things happening which may jeopardize the judiciary. For example:
(a) recent presidents have politicized the judiciary even
* Inaugural Lecture by Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Professor of Law, Valparaiso
University School of Law, delivered on April 6, 1983. The original text and colloquial
tone of the lecture have been preserved. Footnotes have been added.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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more than in the past, with the possible exception of
Roosevelt's court-packing plan;2
(b) judges are frequently selected primarily on the basis
of their position on a few current issues;3 having given
an advisory opinion on an issue, without the benefit
of facts, such judges might feel compelled to be con-
sistent when confronted with an actual case;
(c) judges issuing far-reaching decisions in an effort to pro-
tect constitutional rights have come under severe at-
tack from politicians and the community at large;
(d) Congress is considering bills which would remove the
courts' power to hear certain cases and eliminate par-
ticular remedies in other cases;5
(e) in an article appearing in the Wall Street Journal last
year, a Harvard law student expresses an opinion
which I fear is quite prevalent in law schools today;
he concludes that the courts routinely manage schools,
hospitals and prisons and suggests that such excessive
2. As the federal courts play a greater role in shaping important institu-
tions in our society, it is not surprising that special interest groups and politicians
pay closer attention to the selection of judges. See generally Symposium: Judicially
Managed Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 267 (1981). While there is frequent discus-
sion of merit selection, political considerations are certainly the critical threshold. See,
e.g., Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-term: Shaping the Bench (in his
own Image), 66 JUDICATURE 335 (1983); Grossman & Wasby, The Senate and Supreme Court
Nominations: Some Reflections, 1972 DUKE L.J. 557 (1972); Slotnick, The ABA Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary: A Contemporary Assessment, 66 JUDICATURE 349, 385
(1983); Slotnick, Federal Appellate Judge Selection: Recruitment Changes and Unanswered
Questions, 6 JUST. SYS. J. 283 (1981); Slonim, Picking Federal Judges: To the Presidential
Victor Belongs the Spoils, 66 A.B.A. J. 1185 (1980); Reagan's Judicial Selections Draw
Differing Assessments, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 83-84 (Jan. 15, 1983, Graham, Supreme
Court in Recent Term Began Swing to Right that was Sought by Nixon, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 2, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
3. While maintaining that they are not asking nominees how they would
decide specific cases, members of the Senate Judiciary committee come very close
to this under the guise of seeking "judicial philosophy." See, e.g., Nominations of William
H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 16-86 (1971).
4. Judge Johnson refers to this in one of his articles. Johnson, The Role of
the Judiciary with Respect to the Other Branches of Government, 11 GA. L. REV. 455,
474-75 (1977). See also Baucus and Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on
the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988 (1982).
5. S. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (abortion); S. 139, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) (school busing); H.R. 253, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (prayer in public schools).
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judicial management is consistent with the first year
curriculum at Harvard which seems aimed at develop-
ing social engineers rather than traditional lawyers;'
civil procedure, with its emphasis on "public law litiga-
tion," is singled out as the worst culprit.
It is not my goal to summarize or evaluate the various theoretical
approaches to this subject; even if I understood them, I would not
attempt it in this short time. Rather, after briefly exploring the nature
of the more common attacks on the judiciary, I will attempt to de-
fend the so-called "activist" judges on functional grounds which may
or may not be theoretically sound. "Activist" is not a good term
because it can be used to describe a lot of judges I'm not interested
in defending-I want to defend those judges who are frequently
criticized for over-extending the Constitution to protect individuals.
The premise is simply that our system of government, with a con-
stitution which emphasizes individual rights and a political process
which claims to be democratic, needs a strong, active judiciary.
Political reality cannot be ignored. The separation of powers, the
checks and balances built into our constitutional system of govern-
ment obviously must be maintained. However, like other parts of the
Constitution, these concepts are not rigid and must be interpreted
in light of the realities of government today. For example, as the
legislative and executive branches become less accessible and respon-
sive to those without the resources to influence the political process,
the courts must become more accessible to this group which is other-
wise powerless in dealing with government. The issue must be framed
in terms of the proper role of the federal judiciary when other bran-
ches of government default on their constitutional responsibilities.
Without courageous judges, the Bill of Rights would too frequently
represent only hollow promises. If such judges are a necessary part
of our system of government, then we must encourage and support
their efforts to guard individual rights from the will of the majority.
B. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE REASONS FOR THE CONTROVERSY
SURROUNDING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY?
It certainly cannot be denied that there are some very legitimate
questions and concerns about the proper role of the federal judiciary.
To an extent, the controversy is inherent in the division of powers
mandated by our Constitution. One argument is that the courts have
6. Troy, Learning the Law at Harvard, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1982, at 14.
1983]
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usurped the functions of the executive and legislative branches in cer-
tain areas. While the lines between the three branches are not always
drawn with precision, it is argued that some decisions clearly exceed
the authority of the courts. Related to this is the argument that many
decisions of the federal courts deal with matters which are not ap-
propriate for the judiciary because it is an undemocratic institution.
Federal judges are appointed by the President, with the consent of
the Senate, with life-time tenure. It is virtually impossible to remove
a federal judge from office. Another argument is based on the con-
cepts embodied in the tenth amendment-the separation of powers
between state and federal government. To the extent that federal
courts invalidate state legislation and order state officials to either
take or refrain from certain actions, it is argued that the federal courts
have overstepped the bounds implicit in the tenth amendment.
As mentioned, efforts are under way to limit the power of the
federal judiciary.' In large part, the impetus for these efforts is
disagreement with particular decisions rather than the more principled
grounds listed above. Legislation which places limitations on the
courts' power to either hear certain types of cases or order certain
remedies is being considered by Congress. The most recent proposals
of this kind deal with abortion, prayer in the schools and busing as
a remedy for school segregation. These efforts are so drastic and
represent such a basic disruption of our system of government, that
even those who are critical of some of the decisions of the federal
courts frequently oppose such efforts to deal with the perceived
abuses.' A more legitimate way of dealing with unpopular constitu-
tional decisions is through the more difficult constitutional amendment
process. Such efforts are also underway.'
A less direct attack on the federal judiciary, which has probably
been utilized for many years but seems more prevalent today, relates
to the initial selection of judges. Based on their own view of the proper
role of the judiciary, and in an effort to solidify their support from
certain "single issue" political groups, recent presidents have announc-
ed in advance that they will be selecting judges whose views on im-
portant issues pending in the courts are consistent with their own
7. See supra note 5.
8. See generally Symposium: Congressional Limits on Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion, 27 VILL. L. REV. 893 (1982); Farren, Restoring School Prayer by Eliminating Judicial
Review: An Examination of Congressional Power to Limit Federal Court Jurisdiction,
60 N.C.L. REV. 831 (1982).
9. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 73, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (school prayer amendment).
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and those of the pressure groups."° This raises questions about whether
the judiciary is really independent, non-political and undemocratic.
Finally, the courts are under attack from within. Frequently rely-
ing on caseload statistics as their justification, too many judges are
willing to restrict the exercise of their jurisdiction in cases brought
by individuals to enforce constitutional rights. This is done under a
variety of self-imposed doctrines. For example, some issues are
classified as "political questions" to avoid hearing them." Standing
often provides a barrier to judicial resolution of issues. Various types
of abstention are utilized to relegate certain matters to the state
courts.'3 Standards for reviewing both federal and state legislation,
except in a few areas where strict scrutiny is required, give exten-
sive deference to the legislative bodies." All of these doctrines serve
as limitations on the role of the federal courts, particularly in con-
stitutional litigation.
If crowded dockets are really the concern, why not develop
similar doctrines to limit diversity cases in federal courts? This would
10. See supra notes 2 and 3.
11. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (plaintiffs sought relief which would have re-
quired judicial surveillance over the training, weaponry and orders of the National
Guard). See also Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J., 517 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
13. There are different types of abstention. The so-called Pullman abstention,
named after Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), requires the federal
court to send the plaintiff to a state court for resolution of a state issue which might
eliminate or substantially affect a federal constitutional question, while retaining jurisdic-
tion over the case. Another type of abstention, based on notions of comity and
federalism, results in dismissal of the federal action. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
14. Strict scrutiny is utilized only in those cases involving classifications which
disadvantage a suspect class or impinge upon the exercise of a fundamental right.
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial discrimination); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting rights); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel). An intermediate level of scrutiny is
utilized in other situations. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex discrimina-
tion); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy). In other cases the court
simply inquires as to whether the legislation is rationally related to some legitimate
state interest. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare benefits);
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (quality of education).
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seem to be a more appropriate place to make cuts in the federal court
docket because it is generally agreed that the historical justification
for such jurisdiction -local bias-is no longer a compelling factor. In-
stead, the courts tend to stretch this jurisdictional grant. While Con-
gress has attempted to limit the number of diversity cases by im-
posing a $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement,15 its effect has been
virtually eliminated by judicial interpretation. If the plaintiff says the
claim is worth in excess of $10,000, that generally satisfies the
requirement."
In light of the valid constitutional questions about the role of
the federal judiciary and the activity on various fronts to limit this
role, I will attempt to justify a more active role for federal judges.
C. DEFENSE OF THE "ACTIVIST" JUDGES
The term "activist," when used to describe judges or courts,
generally has a negative connotation. It is commonly used to describe
judges perceived as being too liberal, such as members of the War-
ren Court. This is true even though the Alabama federal judge, who
recently ignored 30 years of Supreme Court precedent in interpreting
the first amendment to allow prayer in public schools, could certainly
be described as activist but not liberal. 7 Similarly, during the Lochner
era the Court was very active in using substantive due process to
protect big business from certain acts of Congress. 8 Contrary to the
usual negative implications, I suggest that the exact opposite is true-
generally the judges who are labelled activist today are courageous
judges with a healthy appreciation for our constitutional system of
government. In defending the "activist" judges, I will start by ad-
dressing the arguments utilized in the attacks on such judges.
1. Separation of Powers
Implicit in the separation of powers mandated by our Constitu-
tion must be an assumption that each of the three branches of govern-
ment will be accessible to those governed on a somewhat equal basis.
This is clearly not the case today. Many people are virtually without
access to the executive and legislative branches. Even taking into ac-
count my current concerns about the decline in judicial activism, the
15. 28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1976).
16. St. Paul Mercury Indem. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938).
17. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983),
modified sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983).
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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judiciary is still far more accessible to many people than the other
branches. As a result, the majority of the cases which lead to the
most extensive and severe criticism of the federal courts clarify and
enforce the constitutional rights of people with the least access to
the other branches of government. Those charged with criminal of-
fenses, victims of racism, those involuntarily confined to state and
local institutions, those who must rely on social welfare for the
necessities of life and those who have been excluded from the elec-
tion process by voter qualifications and unbalanced districts, are
generally powerless when it comes to influencing the executive and
legislative branches. As a result, the legislative and executive bran-
ches have frequently failed to uphold or have actually infringed upon
the constitutional rights of such persons. When two of the three bran-
ches of government default in their obligation to uphold the Constitu-
tion, it is imperative that the third step in.
While the trend today seems to be in the opposite direction,
several of the decisions in the past which subjected the Supreme Court
to severe criticism involved access to the courts. Accessibility has
been addressed through a series of landmark decisions assuring the
right to counsel in criminal proceedings19 and certain civil proceedings,'
requiring free transcripts for indigents in criminal appeals, 1 requir-
ing the waiver of filing fees in some types of civil matters' and re-
quiring that certain critical evidence be made available without regard
to the parties' ability to pay.23 The courts have also developed special
rules of construction when considering pleadings filed by litigants
without counsel, thereby facilitating access."
If the courts fail to uphold the rights of individuals, it is im-
perative that Congress or the executive branch step in. For example,
several years ago when the U.S. Supreme Court gave Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a more restrictive interpretation than
19. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
20. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (termination
of parental rights); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (transfers from prison to state
mental institution); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revocation of parole). See
also Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983) (establishes guidelines for district
court judges in deciding whether to appoint counsel for pro se litigants).
21. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
22. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
23. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (an indigent defendant in a paternity
action is entitled to blood grouping tests, with the cost of such tests to be paid by
the state).
24. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
1983]
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intended by Congress," Congress immediately amended the statute
to make it clear that discrimination against pregnant women was "sex"
discrimination within the meaning of the Act.2" This sort of "dialogue"
between two branches of government is healthy. Unfortunately, there
are not enough examples of the other branches stepping in.
Frequently legislative and executive officials are fully aware that
they are violating individuals' constitutional rights but are unwilling
to change their practices or policies because such change would not
be politically expedient. This leads to situations where well-intentioned
officials invite litigation because court-mandated changes do not carry
the same political liabilities as voluntary changes. Voters can hardly
blame elected officials for implementing a court order. The constant
concern about being re-elected is obviously one of the shortcomings
of the legislative and executive branches, particularly when it comes
to protecting individual rights. It was clearly a stroke of brilliance
on the part of the framers of the Constitution when they removed
certain basic, individual rights from the political process. Justice
Jackson, in striking down a West Virginia regulation requiring public
school children to salute the flag, stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw cer-
tain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote:
They depend on the outcome of no elections. 7
The practical inability of the legislative and executive branches
to protect individual rights is one of the strongest arguments in favor
of judicial activism, particularly on behalf of those generally excluded
from the political process. As indicated earlier, a rigid separation of
powers makes little sense to those who are generally excluded from
the political process. For these people, the courts are truly the forum
of last resort.
2. Federalism and States' Rights
The states' rights argument, loosely tied to the tenth and
25. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
26. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980).
27. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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eleventh amendments and notions of fedealism, is without merit when
the courts are asked to enforce provisions of the Constitution which
on their face serve as restrictions on the states. The primary exam-
ple of this is the fourteenth amendment. It was passed because of
the states' inability or unwillingness to protect constitutional rights.
The supremacy of federal law requires that the courts invalidate state
legislation, policies and practices whenever they conflict with federal
requirements. Therefore, while the tenth amendment has some vitality
in the area of commerce,2" it is relatively insignificant when dealing
with individual rights protected by the Constitution.'
Similarly, broad notions of federalism are unconvincing as a basis
for restricting the activity of the federal courts. These judge-made
limitations, such as various types of abstention,' on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction, which have enjoyed extraordinary growth under
the Burger Court, are generally undisciplined and too frequently serve
as nothing more than rhetoric for avoiding meritorious claims. When
state or local officials are violating federal laws, why should the federal
courts be reluctant to intervene? Shouldn't the primary purpose of
federal courts be to protect federally created rights?
It is far too simplistic to suggest that state court judges have been
sworn to uphold the federal constitution and, therefore, it is ap-
propriate to send some plaintiffs seeking to enforce federal rights to
the state courts. While civil rights litigants may choose state court
in a few states, in the vast majority of states civil rights attorneys
will consistently select the federal forum whenever it is available. 1
There may be a variety of reasons for this, but the primary reason
relates to the state court judges' ties to state and local politics. Often
they are concerned about re-election. Obviously there are excellent
state court judges but in most jurisdictions it is too easy for defense
attorneys to get civil rights cases out of the hands of these judges.32
Even where you can select and retain such a judge on the trial level,
state appellate court judges are generally more closely aligned with
the political process than federal judges. This is certainly not meant
28. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981);
Nat'l. League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
29. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
30. See supra note 13.
31. See discussion of this in Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1105 (1977).
32. For example, Indiana Trial Rule 76 gives defendants an absolute right
to one change of venue from the county and one change from the judge.
1983]
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to suggest that political considerations are not important in the selec-
tion of federal judges; in recent years, just the opposite is true.
However, lifetime tenure and compelling fact situations often lead even
the most politically conservative federal judges to rise above their
personal preferences in enforcing constitutional rights.
This suggests another reason why it is important for the federal
courts to continue to play an active role in enforcing individual con-
stitutional rights. Only through application to concrete fact situations
can the Constitution remain alive and responsive to our ever-changing
society. Even when Congress passes enforcement legislation, it
generally requires refinement through court decisions. Because of
political compromise, difficult issues are purposely avoided in the
legislative process. The courts are expected to fill in the gaps.' Even
absent political considerations, the executive and legislative branches
generally deal with broader issues and often cannot foresee the
ramifications of legislation when it is applied to individual cir-
cumstances. With their emphasis on a "case or controversy," the courts
are better able to humanize the law by interpreting it in light of
human fact situations.
3. Undemocratic Nature of Federal Judiciary
Opposition to an active judiciary on the grounds that it is
undemocratic may have some merit, but it has serious limitations.
First, it assumes that the other branches of government are
democratic. To the extent democracy implies that government reflects
the will of the majority, we do not have a pure democracy in this
country. While the majority of those who vote in any given election
determine the makeup of the legislative branch and some of the ex-
ecutive officials, this does not necesarily mean that we have a true
democracy. For years before various court decisions, decisions which
are heavily criticized by some, many people were systematically ex-
cluded from the election process.' Getting elected takes a tremen-
33. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979), the Court
indicated its preference for more direction from Congress. This may be unrealistic,
particularly in complex or controversial legislation. See, e.g., Steinberg, Implied Rights
of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 41 (1979); Wartelle & Louden,
Federal Enforcement of Federal Statutes; the Role of the S 1983 Remedy, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 487, 536-37 (1982).
34. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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dous amount of resources and those with resources have a dispropor-
tionate amount of influence in determining who gets elected and what
they do after they are elected. The importance of resources excludes
a high percentage of the population from ever considering elective
office. Within the legislative process, deals and compromises, when
combined with the influence of powerful lobbyists, result in legisla-
tion which may be strongly opposed by the majority of people. The
executive branch, while headed by an elected president, is to a great
extent run by lifetime civil servants or bureaucrats. At the level where
the executive agencies directly affect the average citizen, the influence
of the elected official-the President-is not always apparent.
Second, as indicted earlier, certain parts of the Constitution were
by design taken away from majority rule. The framers of the Con-
stitution did not intend for individual rights to be dependent on the
will of the majority. Therefore, it is not important that the branch
of government with the primary responsibility for enforcing individual
rights be democratic.
Third, while the judiciary may not be as democratic as the other
branches, Congress can certainly influence the judiciary. When the
courts interpret legislation contrary to the intent of Congress, it is
open to Congress to revise or amend the legislation to "correct" an
inappropriate court decision. The amendment to Title VII to correct
the Court's limiting definition of sex discrimination is an example. 5
This is less possible when the courts interpret the Constitution,
however, even there the executive and legislative branches can have
an influence on the courts. The Constitution can be amended. Also,
the courts give deference to Congress when it acts to enforce the
Constitution under enabling provisions such as section five of the four-
teenth amendment." To a great extent, enforcement of broad sweep-
ing court decisions requires the cooperation of the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches. While the decisions obviously represent a powerful
35. See supra notes 25 and 26.
36. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court considered the
constitutionality of S 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e), and
whether Congress had exceeded its power under S 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
In upholding the legislation, the Court utilized the test established by Chief Justice
Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819):
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.
In applying this test, the Court noted that "lilt is enough that we be able to perceive
a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." 384 U.S. at 653.
1983]
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impetus for change, decisions reforming state institutions are not self-
executing. Fortunately, such decisions are frequently implemented with
the cooperation of the other branches because executive and legislative
officials appreciate the appropriateness of them. In other words, court
orders serve to get the attention of legislative and executive officials
and provide the catalyst for change.
At least to some extent, the legislative branch can control the
judiciary by expanding and contracting jurisdiction.37 When some
members of the federal judiciary complain about the flood of civil
rights actions in the federal courts, they are asking Congress to place
restrictions on the access of civil rights litigants to federal court. As
indicated earlier, because these cases seek to enforce federal rights,
they are more appropriate for the federal courts than the many cases
in federal court only because of diversity of citizenship. However,
powerful interest groups like the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America and big business, which favor diversity jurisdiction for a
variety of reasons," have been very successful in overcoming efforts
to eliminate it. 9
4. Justification for More Activism
Undoubtedly there are other arguments against judicial activism
and there are probably better responses to the arguments than I have
given. However, whatever the merits of these arguments, in my mind
the overriding consideration supporting judicial activism is a very func-
tional one -necessity. Under our Constitution it would not be tolerable
to have a system of government in which all three branches are vir-
tually inaccessible to vast segments of the population. Justice Stone
37. With the exception of the U.S. Supreme Court, Article III of the U.S.
Constitution is simply an enabling act giving Congress the power to create "such in-
ferior Courts as [it] may from time to time ordain and establish."
38. The primary reason is that lawyers and their clients prefer having a choice
of forum.
39. Several years ago Congress considered bills which would have eliminated
diversity jurisdiction. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), passed the House on
February 28, 1978; when it was introduced in the Senate, it competed with another
bill, S. 2094, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which proposed only partial curtailment of
diversity. Both bills died in the Senate Committee. See also H.R. 2202, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979), and S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). For an example of the testimony
offered by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America see Diversity of Citizen-
ship/Magistrates Reform: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 70 (1977) (statement of Robert G. Begam, past president and chairman, Na-
tional Affairs Department, Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
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suggests this in a now famous footnote in Carolene Products where
he questions
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
He certainly supports a functional approach in attempting to define
the proper role for the judiciary. To me this footnote indicates that
the judiciary must act as the "safety net" of our three branch system
of government-it must assure that government is accessible to all.
It is not enough that legislative and executive officials are theoretically
accessible; they must be actually accessible so that citizens' grievances
receive meaningful consideration.
Why give this important function to the courts? Not only is the
judicial branch currently the most accessible to the average individual,
the courts can serve as a method of access to the other branches as
well. A favorable decision from a federal judge gives the cause of
an otherwise powerless individual legitimacy. The decision converts
the plea of an individual who is otherwise ignored into a mandate
from a generally respected federal court judge. This gets the atten-
tion of other officials. Consider the following example. Probably the
most powerless persons in our society are those who are involuntari-
ly confined in state institutions. Nearly all of them arepoor and a
disproportionate number are members of a racial minority. Even
without the assistance of attorneys, such persons can get the atten-
tion of federal judges by filing inartful, handwritten pleadings. In most
courts, this sets in motion all of the procedures surrounding the
judicial system; this most vividly demonstrates the value of procedure.
Such complaints cannot be ignored by state officials because this could
lead to default. While there is certainly no assurance that all such
complaints have merit and even those with merit will not necessarily
succeed, the point is simply that the.complaint of the most powerless
member of society must be considered in accordance with fairly well
defined and standardized procedures. The opposition must respond.
Contrast this with treatment of the same complaints, alleging
constitutional violations, filed with either executive or legislative
officials. There is generally not a formal grievance process; nothing
requires a response. While there may be a response, it is unlikely
40. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
1983]
Bodensteiner: The Role of Federal Judges: Their Duty to Enforce the Constitutio
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
14 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
that it will be meaningful because the individuals filing the complaint
have no political debts to collect and have little if any ability to af-
fect the re-election of the officials involved. There is no mandatory
process. There is no assurance that there will ever be a response-
not even a polite rejection.
Again, this is not meant to suggest that the courts are always
responsive to individual complaints nor that individual complaints
always have merit. Rather, it simply demonstrates the ease of access
to the judicial system and a set of procedures which, absent applica-
tion of vague judge-made doctrines designed to limit the exercise of
jurisdiction in some cases, require consideration of the complaints on
the merits. In many situations, the availability of the courts may be
the only thing which deters the oppressed from resorting to the
streets. Assuming we prefer a more orderly means of redressing
grievances, we should be grateful to the courts.
Before concluding that broad-sweeping federal court decisions,
requiring extensive reforms in governmental institutions and large
expenditures of public funds, represent an abuse of judicial power,
we should consider the following questions.
1. Is there an alternative forum where the plaintiffs could
have obtained meaningful consideration of their
grievance?
2. Does the situation addressed by the court result from
a default or failure on the part of executive or
legislative officials-have they had an opportunity to
remedy the situation?
3. How outrageous, or how compelling, were the facts
presented to the court?
4. In light of an oath to uphold the constitutional rights
of individuals, what would you have done as judge?
Having found a constitutional violation, would you
nevertheless reinforce the behavior of the responsible
officials by refusing an effective remedy?
Ask yourself these questions in the context of a suit challenging
conditions and treatment in a state school and hospital for the retard-
ed. The judge describes the situation as follows:
The Associate Commissioner for Mental Retardation for the
... Department of Mental Health testified that [the institu-
tion] was sixty percent overcrowded; that the school,
although it had not, could immediately discharge at least
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300 residents; and that seventy percent of the residents should
never have been committed at all. The conclusion that there
was no opportunity for habilitation for its residents was in-
escapable. Indeed, the evidence reflected that one resident
was scalded to death when a fellow resident hosed water
from one of the bath facilities on him; another died as a
result of the insertion of a running water hose into his rec-
tum by a working resident who was cleaning him; one died
when soapy water was forced into his mouth; another died
of a self-administered overdose of inadequately stored drugs;
and authorities restrained another resident in a straitjacket
for nine years to prevent him from sucking his hands and
fingers. Witnesses described the ... facilities as barbaric
and primitive; some residents had no place to sit to eat
meals, and coffee cans served as toilets in some areas of
the institution.
With the exception of the interim emergency order
designed to eliminate hazardous conditions ... the court at
first declined to devise specific steps to improve existing
conditions in [the state's] mental health and retardation
facilities. Instead, it directed the Department of Mental
Health to design its own plan for upgrading the system to
meet constitutional standards. Only after two deadlines had
passed without any signs of acceptable progress did the
court itself, relying upon the proposals of counsel for all
parties ... , define the minimal constitutional standards of
care, treatment, and habilitation for which the case ... has
become generally known.4
Should this judge be criticized? Only if you think he waited too long
to mandate a remedy. Would there be a public outcry if in this situa-
tion the judge simply ordered the release of the named plaintiff from
the institution? Probably not. This tells us something about the nature
of the criticism.
A procedural rule providing for class actions has made the courts
more accessible.' It has also made judges much more vulnerable to
criticism. For example, no one gets too upset if a judge simply finds
that a school system has discriminated against an individual black stu-
dent and orders the school officials to remedy the situation by pro-
viding the student an equal educational opportunity. Such an order
41. Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REV.
903, 909 (1976).
42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
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would not be viewed as too significant. However, when the same case
is brought on behalf of a class of all black students attending the school
system and the relief attempts to provide all black children in the
school system with an equal educational opportunity, then the judge
is accused of taking over the school system. The same is true of court-
ordered reforms of other state and local institutions. An order re-
quiring the institution to provide an individual inmate with medical
care draws little attention. In contrast, an order requiring the institu-
tion to establish a plan whereby all inmates can receive adequate
medical care quickly draws the criticism of the public and members
of the other branches of government. Why the different response when
the liability determination made by the court is precisely the same?
The court is simply accomplishing in one lawsuit what would have
to be done in a series of lawsuits if all the individuals affected brought
their own case. What is wrong with judicial economy?
It would seem that the real criticism is directed to the fact that
the class action device has suddenly made the judicial system much
more accessible to more people. One client, with one attorney, in one
lawsuit can bring the grievances of thousands of individuals before
the court. Absent Rule 23, it is fair to assume that a very small per-
centage of the individuals concerned would take the initiative to pre-
sent their grievances to a court. So the real goal of those attacking
the judges may very well be to further deprive the powerless of ac-
cess to government.
D. THE ACTIVISM DEMONSTRATED BY THE WARREN COURT
MUST BE MADE MORE ACCEPTABLE
Because I believe it is imperative that all citizens have access
to at least one branch of our government, federal judges like the one
involved in the case described above must be encouraged to not only
continue but increase their "activism." That is, federal judges must
continue to enforce the constitutional rights of the powerless-those
without meaningful access to the other branches of government. If
my assessment is correct-that the number of federal judges in the
mold of the Warren Court is on the decline-then an obvious ques-
tion is what can be done about it.
I think attorneys, both as individuals and as members of
organized bar associations, must come to the defense of those
courageous judges who are willing to enforce federal law even when
it is extremely unpopular in their community. Just as it is often not
easy for attorneys to litigate unpopular cases, so too it is not easy
for judges to decide cases upsetting well-established practices and
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policies in a particular community. Frequently the judges must bear
the brunt of the community outrage which executive and legislative
branch officials are unwilling to face. Judges are humans who have
lives off the bench; often they and their families live in the com-
munities demonstrating hostility toward their decisions. Support is
obviously critical. The most likely source of such support is from their
peers in the community-the legal profession -because lawyers should
best understand the important role of these judges."3 Instead, it is
often attorneys who lead the opposition when unpopular decisions are
announced.
Certainly there is nothing. wrong with debating the merits of such
decisions; this should be encouraged. But it is very troublesome when
attorneys avoid the merits of the case and either attack the individual
judge involved or the judiciary as a whole simply because they
disagree with the decision. Community acceptance is obviously a very
important part of implementing any court decree and the legal com-
munity has an important role to play in facilitating such acceptance.
The press is also very important in shaping community opinion relative
to unpopular court decisions. Although some federal court judges have
written law review articles defending their activism," they are
generally not free to defend themselves through the media.' Therefore
individual attorneys and organized bar associations should make an
effort to assure that the community at least understands both sides
of an issue and the reason why judges must intervene when constitu-
tional rights are being violated. Public debate and discussion of the
43. An indication of attorneys' obligations in this area can be found in the
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 8-6 (1982):
Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism. While
a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such officials publicly he should
be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate language, and
avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend
to lessen public confidence in our legal system. Criticisms motivated by
reasons other than a desire to improve the legal system are not justified.
(Footnotes omitted.)
44. See, e.g., Johnson, The Role of the Judiciary With Respect to the Other
Branches of Government, 11 GA. L. REV. 455 (1977); Johnson, The Constitution and the
Federal District Judge, 54 TEX. L. REV. 903 (1976); Swygert, In Defense of Judicial Ac-
tivism, 16 VAL U.L. REV. 439 (1982); Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic
Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968).
45. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, S A(6) (1982) ("A judge
should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any
court ... "); Id., Canon 4 (judge "may engage in ... quasi-judicial activities, if in doing
so he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may
come before him").
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appropriate role of judicial review in our system of government should
also be encouraged. But this too should be on a higher, more principled
level instead of emotional, personal attacks on certain judges.
Judges can, and frequently do, make efforts to facilitate com-
munity acceptance and implementation of court decrees by involving
the defendants, and the community to the extent possible, in the
formulation of the actual relief. A determination of liability and a broad
outline of necessary relief is combined with an order requiring the
defendants to submit a plan for implementing the relief."' Ordering
the defendants to formulate the exact contours of the relief, often
with the participation of the plaintiffs, increases the chances that the
defendants will cooperate in bringing about the necessary changes.
This is quite natural because even though a court has mandated
change, the defendants now have a stake in the success of their own
plan.
Efforts by the courts to utilize this method of formulating relief
have not always met with success. Frequently defendants engage in
dilatory, bad faith tactics."7 Either they do not submit a plan, or they
submit a plan which cannot be approved by a court or they submit
a plan which is approved but with which they have no intent to com-
ply. When this happens, a court must act swiftly and firmly in order
to bring about the necessary changes. As a deterrent, such dilatory,
bad faith conduct should be punished with an assessment of punitive
damages. This plus a substantial award of attorney fees"8 to the plain-
tiffs should make it costly enough that ill-willed executive and
legislative officials will have no choice but to implement and enforce
the constitutional rights of individuals. When officials have been given
this sort of opportunity to correct their illegal conduct, there is cer-
tainly no basis for criticizing the courts for intervening. This situa-
tion represents an even more outrageous default by the other two
branches of government. Such defaults must be made costly in order
to make the other branches more responsive to the rights of in-
dividuals. Payment of substantial damages and fee awards by state
and local governmental entities should cause taxpayers to take note
and express their disapproval at the next election.
Those who see judicial activism as a problem and criticize the
46. Judge Johnson discusses his efforts in Wyatt v. Stickney in Johnson, The
Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REV. 903, 909 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Attorney fees are generally available to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights
actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1988 (1976).
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judiciary because of it should be challenged to address the question
of access to government. How do they propose to make the other
branches of government more accessible and more responsive to the
oppressed and even the average citizen? Is it possible to develop pro-
cedures whereby citizens can trigger a systematic response to their
grievances from the executive and legislative branches?
The theories utilized, particularly by the Warren Court, to make
the judicial process more accessible to all, regardless of wealth and
influence, are not totally inapplicable to the other branches of govern-
ment. In other words, if the executive and legislative branches are
accessible only to those with resources, due process and equal pro-
tection concerns are raised. Isn't a branch of our government, such
as the legislative branch, inherently unfair if it is inaccessible to a
substantial portion of our population? To some extent, the so-called
activist judges have alleviated this concern by their willingness to
consider cases brought by those who are generally excluded from the
political process and therefore the other branches of government. Ab-
sent the willingness of the courts to hear such cases, our entire system
of government is inaccessible to substantial segments of our popula-
tion. Until the legislative and executive branches do something to
alleviate this situation, the courts must step in and act as the "safety
net."
E. CONCLUSION
In summary, an active federal judiciary is not only defensible,
it is imperative in our system of government as it currently operates.
The activist federal judges should be supported and commended for
their courageous efforts to keep government at least somewhat ac-
cessible and responsive to the powerless.
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